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Abstract
The case of fisheries management illustrates how the inherent structural instability
of ecosystems can have deep-running policy implications. We contrast ten types
of management plans to achieve maximum sustainable yields (MSY) from multiple
stocks and compare their effectiveness based on a management strategy evalua-
tion (MSE) that uses complex food webs in its operating model. Plans that target
specific stock sizes (BMSY) consistently led to higher yields than plans targeting spe-
cific fishing pressures (FMSY). A new self-optimising control rule, introduced here
for its robustness to structural instability, led to intermediate yields. Most plans
outperformed single-species management plans with pressure targets set without
considering multispecies interactions. However, more refined plans to “maximise
the yield from each stock separately”, in the sense of a Nash equilibrium, produced
total yields comparable to plans aiming to maximise total harvested biomass, and
were more robust to structural instability. Our analyses highlight trade-offs between
yields, amenability to negotiations, pressures on biodiversity, and continuity with
current approaches in the European context. Based on these results, we recommend
directions for developments of EU fisheries policy.
Keywords: theoretical ecology; food webs; structural instability; harvest control rule;
management strategy evaluation; maximum sustainable yield; Common Fisheries Policy
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1 Introduction
1.1 Four questions about multispecies MSY
Fisheries management aiming to attain maximum sustainable yield (MSY) from multiple
interacting stocks is considerably more complicated than single-stock management (Pope
1976; Bulgakova and Kizner 1986; Collie et al. 2003; Walters et al. 2005; Matsuda and
Abrams 2006; Gecˇek and Legovic´ 2012; Houle et al. 2013; Voss et al. 2014; Thorpe et al.
2016). A priori it is not even clear what the best translation of the MSY objective for a
single, isolated stock is to cases with multispecies interactions, i.e. with feeding and com-
petitive interactions among species (for simplicity, we use “stock” interchangeable with
“fish species” in this paper). Even when a management objective considering multispecies
interactions is defined, attaining it can be difficult because these interactions are generally
not well known. It is therefore not surprising if legislation aiming at MSY acknowledges
the role of multispecies interactions in principle, but tends to play it down. Examples
are §§301.a.3, 303.b.12 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act (U.S. Department of Commerce
2007) or Article 9.3.b of the Common Fisheries Policy (EU 2013), but see, §13(2) of New
Zealand’s Fisheries Act (Parliamentary Council Office 2014). In the current practice of
fisheries management, multispecies interactions among managed stocks play only a mi-
nor role. Noteworthy exceptions are cases where stock assessments take account of the
dependence of predation mortality on the abundances of other species (Gjøsæter et al.
2015; ICES 2014b).
To contribute to the development of management practices mindful of multispecies
interactions we ask here:
Q1: How can the singe-species MSY objective be translated into the multispecies case?
Q2: Which strategies are suited to achieve such objectives?
Q3: How do these options compare with regards to the yields they achieve, the de-
gree of collaboration among players required to reach the objectives, pressures on
biodiversity, and their political acceptability?
Q4: How much can be gained from multispecies management in comparison with man-
agement disregarding ecological interactions?
Three conceivable answers to each Q1 and Q2 are given in the following two sections.
Hence there are two high-level policy choices to be made. The first choice is of the
management objective, the second of the type of strategy employed to achieve it. Each of
the resulting nine variants we call a management plan.
To answer Q3, we performed formal management strategy evaluations (MSE, Walters
and Hilborn 1976; Hilborn and Walters 1992) of these plans. That is, the outcomes of the
plans were evaluated by applying them to fisheries in hypothetical ecosystems, described
by an operating model, that are not fully known to the manager. To answer Q4, evaluation
scores were compared with those for management that aims at MSY for the same set of
stocks while disregarding multispecies interactions, modelled after current EU practice.
∗corresponding author
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1.2 First policy choice: the management objective
There is no unique way of translating the single-species MSY objective to the multispecies
case. Maximisation of yield from one stock will generally require different strategies than
maximisation of yield from another. In a simple predator-prey system, for example, the
maximisation of yield from the prey requires culling the predator, while by not exploiting
the prey yield from the predator can be maximised (May et al. 1979; Clark 1990).
The three types of high-level objective we consider here are:
- Nash Pressure: To fish all exploited stocks at such rates that changes in the ex-
ploitation rate of any single stock cannot increase the long-term yield from that
stock.
- Nash State: To keep all exploited stocks at such sizes (e.g. in terms of spawning
stock biomass) that changes in the size of any single stock cannot increase the
long-term yield from that stock.
- Total Yield : Maximisation of the summed long-term yield from all exploited stocks.
These objectives are generally equivalent only in absence of multispecies interactions.
The objectives Nash Pressure and Nash State are two ways of implementing the idea
of “maximisation of yield from each stock separately”. They correspond to the Nash
equilibrium outcome in game theory (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994), where no player of
a game could improve its gains by changing its moves. Nash equilibria are traditionally
understood as arising naturally when players are not collaborating. For the Nash Pressure
objective the players are hypothetical fleets, each targeting one specific stock, and the
permitted moves changes in their exploitation rates. For the Nash State objective the
players are hypothetical managers of individual stocks and their moves are the stock
sizes they aim at. The Total Yield objective corresponds a situation where players chose
their moves such that the total gain by all players is maximised. Attaining this objective
generally requires collaboration or enforcement through governing institutions. Figure 1
depicts these three hypothetical games and objectives.
Variants of Total Yield (Pope 1976; Bulgakova and Kizner 1986; Matsuda and Abrams
2006; Gecˇek and Legovic´ 2012; Houle et al. 2013; Voss et al. 2014) and Nash Pressure
objective (Walters et al. 2005; Collie et al. 2003; Moffit et al., 10.1016/j.dsr2.2015.08.002,
in press) have been considered in the literature. We are unaware of studies addressing
the Nash State objective.
1.3 Second policy choice: the strategy
The management strategies that we consider differ by the structure of the corresponding
harvest control rules (Deroba and Bence 2008). All rules ultimately prescribe the total
catch from each stock for a given time period, e.g. a year. This corresponds to total
allowable catches (TAC) if one assumes that allowances are fully used. Combined with
estimates of stock sizes, rules for catches can be formulated in terms of rules for fishing
mortality rates. Depending on how these rates are determined from managers’ knowledge
of stock sizes and interactions, we consider:
- Pressure Target Control, where fishing mortality rates are kept fixed at target values
deemed to be consistent with the selected objective.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the first high-level policy choice as an option between three
hypothetical games. The games correspond to the three high-level management objectives
we consider: Nash Pressure, Nash State and Total Yield. The Nash Pressure players are
managers of hypothetical fleets targeting a single stock, each aiming to maximise yield
from that stock by adjusting its exploitation rate. The Nash State players are hypothetical
managers of individual stocks, aiming to maximise yield from that stock by adjusting its
equilibrium abundance. The last game, maximisation of total yield, requires collaboration
between all players. Infographic design by Georgia Bayliss-Brown.
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- State Target Control, where fishing mortalities are continuously modified such as
to adjust stock sizes to target values deemed to be consistent with the selected
objective.
- Self-Optimising Control, where neither targets for fishing mortalities nor stock sizes
are fixed, and instead target fishing mortalities are varied according to homogeneous
linear functions of stock sizes. These functions are chosen such that the expected
resulting equilibrium state is consistent with the selected objective.
Formal mathematical definitions of these objectives are given in Supplementary Material,
SM S1.
1.4 Simplifications, complications, negotiations
To simplify analysis and discussion, and to isolate the particular implications of multi-
species interactions, a number of complications relevant in the practice of management
are not covered in our analysis. First, plans do not generally include constraints resulting
from conservation objectives. There are several conceivable implementations of such con-
straints, among others those associated with FPA, BPA, or Btrigger reference points (ICES
2014a; Task Force on Multiannual Plans 2014), and we would not want to confound the
side effects of specific implementations with the implications of the policy choices stud-
ied here. Instead, we determine biodiversity impacts of the unconstrained management
plants. Second, neither technical interactions among fleets, that is, complications due to
limitations to stock-selectivity of fishing, nor the resulting issues surrounding by-catch
and discards are considered. Third, we disregard differences in market value of species and
other factors differentiating between biomass and economic yields. Forth, environmental
stochasticity, including recruitment variability, is not considered, despite its importance
for stock assessments and decision making. Real-world management must take all these
and many other complications into account and adapt objectives and strategies accord-
ingly. The plans we consider could be modified to this end, at moderate cost in complexity
and presumably with little effect on the trends we find.
However, managing each of these complications involves value judgements, and pre-
sumably requires negotiations among stakeholders. Rather than prejudicating such ne-
gotiations, one can ask how easy the negotiations would be when based on the different
objectives we investigate. By definition, long-term yield is maximal for each player under
the Nash Nash Pressure objective, and so will not decline much when the player fishes
at slightly different rates—and similarly for Nash State (impacts on yields from other
stocks, however, can be larger!). Stakeholders will therefore be open to negotiations of
their targets. This intuition is captured by proposals to define MSY as a “range” of
targets rather than a particular “point” (Task Force on Multiannual Plans 2014), and to
use this flexibility to take technical constraints into account. Achievement of the Total
Yield objective generally involves trading the yield from one stock off against that from
another, generating winners and losers among fleets (Voss et al. 2014). Negotiations aim-
ing for Total Yield can therefore be more difficult. The question arises what the loss in
yields would be when opting for a Nash equilibrium to avoid these difficulties. This is
addressed below.
As a technical simplification, required for computational reasons, our models do not
structure populations by size or age. For food-web interactions, corresponding population
dynamics can be derived from size-structured models using projection methods (Rossberg
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and Farnsworth 2011; Rossberg 2012b). However, this means we disregard size-selectivity
effects. We consider this a legitimate simplification, because, in a first approximation, op-
timisation of size selectivity and of fishing mortality for given size selectivity are separate
problems (Law and Grey 1988; Getz 2012; Scott and Sampson 2011).
1.5 Structural instability of natural and modelled ecological
communities
A particular concern of this study are the management implications of structural insta-
bility of ecological communities (Rossberg 2013, Chapter 18). By structural instability
we mean that, in a community of interacting populations, small changes in environ-
mental conditions or external pressures can lead to large changes in population sizes
(Yodzis 1988). Structural instability manifests itself, among others, through the difficul-
ties fisheries modellers experience in parameterizing models of interacting species such
that these reproduce observed community structure and dynamics. Small deviations of
model structure or parameters from reality can lead to very different model states. While
the phenomenon as such is well known (Andersen and Ursin 1977; Flora et al. 2011; Hill
et al. 2007; Novak et al. 2011; Yodzis 1988), the likely underlying ecological mechanism
has only recently been revealed (Rossberg 2013, Chapters 14-18). Because structural
instability increases with species richness (Novak et al. 2011), naturally assembled com-
munities eventually saturate at richness levels where structural instability is so large that
the perturbation from one species’ invasion leads, on average, to extirpation of one other
species.
Structural instability poses a dilemma to every fisheries modeller interested in the
implications of multispecies interactions. If models have less structural instability than
in nature, pressure-state relations might not be correctly represented, leading to incorrect
projections for MSY. If, on the other hand, the model’s structural instability is as large
as in nature, the model will be difficult to parameterize. Besides, comparing a model’s
structural instability to reality is difficult. In our MSE, these problems are avoided by
abandoning the idea of using an operating model representative of a specific natural
community—for our general analysis, this might not even be desirable. Instead, model
communities are constructed through a random process that mimics natural assembly and
turnover of aquatic food webs. This leads to the kind of community saturation thought to
be responsible for structural instability in nature (Borrelli et al. 2015). Since, in addition,
the resulting communities have macroecological properties similar to marine communities
(Fung et al. 2013), we expect them to exhibit structural instability of a degree similar to
that of marine systems.
We introduce below a method (“conservatism”) capable of mitigating the adverse
effects of structural instability on management outcomes. In essence, it consists in avoid-
ing management targets that are too different from the current community state to be
reliably described by inherently inaccurate management models. Instead, management
gradually adapts targets to meet the objective.
It turns out that the answers to above questions Q3 and Q4 are essentially determined
by structural instability. Key results of our MSE can be anticipated mathematically from
structural instability and general principles of community dynamics alone, as we high-
light below by referring to corresponding mathematical considerations developed in Sup-
plementary Material. The good agreement between general theoretical expectations and
simulations using a complex model suggests that these expectations are sufficiently robust
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to be fulfilled in the real world as well. This justifies us in deriving recommendations for
practical fisheries management from this study.
2 Methods
2.1 Operating model
The operating model representing “reality” in our MSE is the Population Dynamical
Matching Model (PDMM; Rossberg et al. 2008; Fung et al. 2013; Rossberg 2013). It
describes structure and dynamics of aquatic food webs with species resolution. Species
in the PDMM have different maturation body masses, which determine, through allo-
metric scaling laws (Yodzis and Innes 1992), maximum growth rates and consumption-
independent loss rates (metabolic losses and non-predation mortality). The consumption
of a resource species by a consumer species is modelled through a Type II functional
response, modified to model prey-switching following van Leeuwen et al. (2013). For any
two species in the PDMM, their trophic interaction strength depends on their relative
body masses and the match between two kinds of abstract traits that characterise them
as consumers and resources. Size preference is parameterized through a population-level
predator-prey size ratio window (Rossberg 2012b). For a full description of the model,
see Rossberg (2013, Chapter 22) and SM S2.
In the parameterization used here, the model spans approximately five trophic levels
and resolves species and their interactions over 17 orders of magnitude in maturation
body size (median range 10−15 to 101.8 kg). Following Fung et al. (2013), species with
maturation body sizes larger than 1 g are interpreted as fish. When numbering the S
species in the model from the largest to the smallest, so the first SF species are the fish,
this leads to population dynamics of the general form
dBi
dt
= gi(B1, . . . , BS)Bi − FiBi (1 ≤ i ≤ SF ), (1a)
dBi
dt
= gi(B1, . . . , BS)Bi (SF < i ≤ S), (1b)
where t is time. The momentary growth rate gi(. . . ) of the population biomass Bi of each
species i depends on its direct biological interactions with other species. The parameters
Fi represent exploitation rates, and for each fish species i the product Yi = FiBi is the
yield from that species per unit time. Exploitation rates are proportional to adult fishing
mortalities and typically attain numerically similar values (Shephard et al. 2012), hence
our use of the symbol F .
PDMM model communities are generated by simulating the natural processes of com-
munity assembly and turnover by iteratively adding species to the model and removing
those that go extinct, until S fluctuates around some equilibrium. This is done with all
exploitation rates (Fi) set to zero. Each MSE was performed using 37 different samples
from this community, taken after every 10.000 species additions and therefore composed
of largely independent sets of species (of 40 communities so sampled, the first 3 were
discarded as burn-in). In our parameterization (SM S2), each sample contained around
2000 species, of which between 9 and 38 were fish (mean 22.4).
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2.2 Management model
As the management model, we used the multispecies extension of Schaefer’s (1954) surplus
production (or multispecies Lotka-Volterra) model (Pope 1976, 1979)
dBi
dt
=
[
ri −
SF∑
j=1
GijBj
]
Bi − FiBi, (2)
where the surplus productivities ri and interaction coefficients Gij (1 ≤ i, j ≤ SF ) are
constants. This model has frequently been studied for management applications (Bul-
gakova and Kizner 1986; Collie et al. 2003; Gaichas et al. 2012; ICES 1989; Pope 1979).
It has the advantages of compatibility with the abstractions employed in the operating
model, Eq. (1), formal simplicity, and a low number of fitting parameters compared to
processed-based models. Management models used in practice are often more complex.
SM S3 describes a method to calibrate the parameters of the management model (ri,
Gij, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ SF ) such that it approximates the dynamics of fish populations in the
operating model, Eq. (1), for states similar to the current. The method is based on the
assumption that the responses of non-fish species to changes in fish populations are fast
compared to these changes. It should therefore work best for fish populations close to
equilibrium, where they change slowly.
A mathematical analysis of the calibration method reveals that structural instability
of the operating model can lead to inaccurate approximations of the operating model
by the management model and to structural instability of the management model itself
(SM S4). Our MSE is designed to capture the implications for management outcomes
of these effects and of incomplete representation of reality by the management model,
because similar issues can arise for management models used in practice. For simplicity,
the MSE does not consider measurement errors of population-dynamical parameters or
implementation errors, and it assumes perfect knowledge of all Bi and and Fi.
Management plans are applied in cycles simulating adaptive management. At the
beginning of each cycle, the management model is calibrated to approximate the dynamics
of the operating model for states similar to the current state. The multispecies harvest
control rule (mHCR, see below) corresponding to the plan is then (re)parameterized
using the management model and used throughout the management cycle. A rather long
period (50 years) is chosen for these cycles to allow the operating model to reach an
equilibrium, because, with our simple calibration algorithm, this results in better fit of
the management model to the operating model in the next cycle. Conceivable effects of
shorter management periods were not investigated.
2.3 Multispecies harvest control rules
The three management strategies we consider differ by the formulae used to determine
exploitation rates (mHCR). The free parameters in these formulae (FMSY,i, BMSY,i, Gˆi)
are chosen such that, if the management model was the correct model of reality, the
corresponding equilibrium state of the system would meet the objective of the plan.
Corresponding analytic expressions are derived in SM S5 following Pope (1979).
The simplest case is Pressure Target Control, where exploitation rates are kept con-
stant at
Fi = FMSY,i (Pressure Target Control) (3)
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for each fish species i.
State Target Control is implemented by a rule
Fi = max
[
0, F0,i +
1
T
(
1− BMSY,i
Bi
)]
(State Target Control), (4)
where the F0,i are defined in the following paragraph, BMSY,i are the targeted stock sizes,
and the parameter T (dimension Time) depends on how fast management attempts to
reach the target. Here we chose T = 1 yr rather small, to model “fixed escapement” man-
agement as recommend by bio-economic analyses with low discount rate. The operation
max [0, . . .] replaces any negative exploitation rate by zero.
As the (time dependent) neutralising exploitation rate F0,i we define the exploitation
rate that would keep stock i at its current size, provided all other stocks and long-term
environmental conditions remain in their current state as well. The values F0,i can be
computed independently of the management model Eq. (2), in practice during yearly
stock-assessments using standard methods, or their multispecies extensions. In our MSE
we set F0,i = gi(B1, . . . , BS), with gi(B1, . . . , BS) as in Eq. (1a). As a result, Eq. (1a)
become effectively
dBi
dt
=
1
T
(BMSY,i −Bi) (effective dynamics under State Target Control) (5)
whenever Fi, as given by Eq. (4), is positive. That is, the State Target Control rule is
designed to achieve exponential approach of all stocks to their target sizes BMSY,i at a
rate 1/T . By modifying Eq. (4) and/or the parameter T , other dynamics for approaching
BMSY,i can be obtained. For the type of plan we recommend in Conclusions below, one
such variant will briefly be discussed.
For the Nash Pressure and Nash State objective, the Self-Optimising Control rule has
the form
Fi = max
[
0, GˆiBi
]
(Self-Optimising Control I), (6)
where the constants Gˆi depend on the interaction coefficientsGij of the fitted management
model, Eq. (2). On average, approximately 4% of the calculated Gˆi were negative for
both Nash Pressure and Nash State and therefore Fi set to zero.
Self-Optimising Control for the Total Yield objective requires
Fi = max
[
0,
SF∑
j=1
GjiBj
]
(Self-Optimising Control II). (7)
The coefficients Gji entering Eq. (7) are directly given by interaction strengths from the
fitted surplus production model, Eq. (2). Because the matrix (Gji) entering Eq. (7) is
the transpose of the interaction matrix G = (Gij) from Eq. (2), we call the scheme in
Eq. (7) Transposed Interaction Control, alluding to the “Transposed Jacobian” scheme
of control theory (Craig 1989).
2.4 Single species harvest control rule
To model Single Species Control as currently being implemented in the EU (Task Force
on Multiannual Plans 2014), we fixed target exploitation rates as in Eq. (3), but now
computed the targets FMSY,i = FSSC,i using single-species surplus production models,
fitted to the operating model’s apparent dynamics for that species when disregarding all
others. See SM S6.
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2.5 Addressing structural instability through conservative
management plans
Mathematical analyses suggest that, due to structural instability, the parameters of
mHCRs can sensitively respond to small errors in the population-dynamical parame-
ters of management models (SM S7) and that inaccuracies in mHCR parameters can
lead to large reductions in yields (SM S8).
It might therefore be advantageous to pursue management strategies that are conser-
vative in the sense of preferring targets that differ less from current states than other,
non-conservative strategies, even if the latter are predicted to be optimal by a naive eval-
uation of the management model. We achieve such conservatism through modifications
of the formulae for mHCR parameters. Technically, we implement a variant of Lavren-
tiev regularisation of matrix inversion (Engl et al. 2000), which improves the numerical
robustness of the calculation, see SM S9. A regularisation parameter controls the degree
of conservatism. Where applicable, we performed the MSE both with that parameter set
to zero (no conservatism) and to a fixed reasonable non-zero value, given in SM S11.2
(standard conservatism). To obtain upper bounds on conceivable further improvements
of outcomes through conservatism, we evaluated in addition plans for the case where the
parameter was chosen for each plan and sample community such that the actual total
long-term yield attained was maximised (optimal conservatism).
2.6 Theoretical maximum sustainable total yield
As a yardstick to compare the outcomes of management plans against, we computed the
theoretical maximum long-term total yield (MSYtheo) achievable from each sampled model
community. This was determined using an evolutionary optimisation algorithm (Stafford
2008). Specifically, we applied the method of Runarsson and Yao (2005) as implemented
in NLopt (http://ab-initio.mit.edu/wiki/index.php/NLopt), modified to improve
convergence (SM S2.2).
2.7 Comparison of management plans
We compared all possible management plans, i.e., combinations of objectives and strate-
gies, based on the total yield they achieved and the resulting impacts on biodiversity
and community size structure. The long-term yield resulting from applying a plan to
a sample community was computed as the time-averaged yield over the duration of 8
adaptive management cycles, after a 24 cycle transition phase. Because MSYtheo varied
substantially among sample communities (CV = 0.40), we quantified the yield from each
plan as the average over all sample communities of the percentage of MSYtheo attained.
As secondary criteria for comparison, we computed the proportion of fish species con-
served (100%− proportion extirpated) and the mean logarithmic maturation body mass
of species at the end of each MSE run. The latter addresses the specific concern that
maximisation of yields might requires culling large piscivorous species to release pressure
on smaller and more productive planktivores. As for yields, both indices were averaged
over all sample communities. For comparison, we calculated these indices also for un-
fished communities after simulating them over a period corresponding to 32 management
cycles, because slow residual dynamics of stocks (Fung et al. 2013) can result in natural
extirpations.
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In the policy context, other criteria will also play a role, for example the similarity
of plans to those currently in place or, based on game theoretical considerations, the
likelihood with which stakeholders will agree to plans or small modifications of them.
Rather than attempting to score plans based on such criteria, key considerations are
suggested in Discussion.
3 Results
Table 1 displays for each type of plan the average proportion of MSYtheo achieved in
the MSE, together with the proportion of surviving species and changes in size structure.
Typical standard errors are around 3% for yield scores, 2% for survival rates, and 0.12 for
mean log size. More detailed statistical results, including error estimates and statistical
significance of differences, are documented in SM S11. There we also report yields for a
second, statistically independent MSE based on model communities of half the size used
here. Remarkably, differences in yield scores between the two MSE are small, suggesting
that our findings depend little on the size of communities.
Table 1 shows that exploitation leading to MSYtheo would come at the cost of conserv-
ing only about 72% of fish species and a change in species size structure corresponding a
drop of 52% (= 1− 101.65−1.97) in geometric mean maturation body mass. Such impacts
are plausible in view of a corresponding survival rate of 51% obtained by Matsuda and
Abrams (2006). Yields from Single Species Control were only about half of MSYtheo and
resulted in survival of 63% of species and a decline in geometric mean size by 45%.
Among the full range of plans considered, a number of general trends can be observed:
1. Independent of objective, State Target Control gave higher long-term yields than
Pressure Target Control. This is expected from structural instability (Rossberg
2013, Chapter 24), as explained in SM S8. Remarkably, these yield increases were
paralleled by higher species survival rates.
2. For the Total Yield objective, conservatism did substantially increase yields with
both Pressure Target Control and State Target Control. The same holds, to a lesser
extent, for the Nash Pressure objective. As theoretically expected from structural
instability (SM S7 and S9), this was not the case for the Nash State objective.
Conservatism increased species survival without exception.
3. With standard conservatism, Self-Optimising Control resulted in yields interme-
diate between State Target Control and Pressure Target Control, independent of
objective.
4. Optimal conservatism led to improvements over standard conservatism by 8.3–
16.9% of MSYtheo. The pattern of improvements was similar to that for the differ-
ence between standard and no conservatism.
5. Independent of objective, yields from Pressure Target Control using standard con-
servatism improved only slightly over Single Species Control. However, yields from
Pressure Target Control with optimal conservatism were notably higher, which indi-
cates potential for some improvements through advances in mathematical methods.
Without conservatism, yield score, survival rate and impact on community size
structure for Pressure Target Control with Nash Pressure objective were almost
identical to Single Species Control.
11
Table 1: Illustration of trade-offs among multispecies management plans to achieve
MSY, as derived from our MSE. Intensity of colouring increases with score attained.
Yield
(% of theoretical maximum sustainable total yield MSYtheo)
Strategy Conser- Objective
vatism other Nash
Pressure
Nash
State
Total
Yield
none 50.6 47.4 33.9
Pressure (‘F ’) Target Control standard 56.7 38.2 56.1
optimal 72.9 46.5 72.8
none 70.6 62.2 57.0
State (‘B’) Target Control standard 73.3 65.9 85.0
optimal 83.4 73.2 93.0
Self-Optimising Control 71.7 62.6 76.4
Single Species Control 51.7
Species survival (% initial number of fish species)
none 62.0 73.3 46.6
Pressure (‘F ’) Target Control standard 68.9 75.2 62.4
optimal 77.0 79.4 69.3
none 70.4 83.7 46.3
State (‘B’) Target Control standard 77.6 89.9 70.4
optimal 80.7 91.0 72.7
Self-Optimising Control 88.9 96.4 65.3
Single Species Control 62.7
MSYtheo 72.0
Unfished 97.1
Fish community mean log10 maturation body mass (grams) at the end of MSE
none 1.70 1.95 1.59
Pressure (‘F ’) Target Control standard 1.84 2.02 1.78
optimal 1.90 1.98 1.80
none 1.68 1.86 1.52
State (‘B’) Target Control standard 1.77 1.96 1.71
optimal 1.80 1.96 1.67
Self-Optimising Control 1.84 1.98 1.56
Single Species Control 1.71
MSYtheo 1.65
Unfished 1.97
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Table 2: Illustration of the impact of conservation constraints on the scores of selected
management plans.
Scoring
criterion
Management
plan
Species
conservation
paired
t-test
p-valuesNo Yes
Yield
State Target Control for Nash Pressure objective 73.3 72.6 0.744
State Target Control for Total Yield objective 85.0 85.5 0.713
Survival
rate
State Target Control for Nash Pressure objective 77.6 87.0 0
State Target Control for Total Yield objective 70.4 91.9 0
Mean
log10 size
State Target Control for Nash Pressure objective 1.77 1.85 0.038
State Target Control for Total Yield objective 1.71 1.90 0.004
6. Independent of strategy, total yields obtained under Nash State objective were
consistently lower than those under Nash Pressure objective.
7. Remarkably, total yields attained aiming for Nash Pressure objective tended to be
similar to or higher than those attained aiming for Total Yield objective. The ex-
pected reversal occurred only with the conservative variants of State Target Control.
With optimal conservatism, State Target Control yield came (on average) within
7% of MSYtheo, while survival rate and impact on community size structure were
almost identical as for MSYtheo.
8. Impacts on species survival and community size structure were consistently lowest
with Nash State, highest with Total Yield and intermediate with Nash Pressure
objective.
4 Discussion
4.1 Biodiversity impacts
In our MSE, strategies that yield more are also beneficial to species survival and com-
munity size structure, while for management objectives this relation is reversed. While
noteworthy, we caution not to over-interpret these relations, because the management
plans could be modified to explicitly incorporate conservation constraints (Matsuda and
Abrams 2006). To illustrate possible implications of conservation constraints, Table 2
compares yield, survival rate and community size structure with and without explicit in-
clusion of such constraints in State Target Control management plans for Nash Pressure
and Total Yield objectives. The constraint in this case is to not purposely deplete fish
populations to less than 10% of their virgin biomass, see SM S5.2. Interestingly, this
modification reduces extirpations and erosion of community size structure substantially,
without significantly affecting yields. In view of this robustness of yields, we disregard
conservation in the following, acknowledging that conservation while aiming at multi-
species MSY requires further study.
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4.2 Structural Instability
Our MSE demonstrates how structural instability of ecosystems, and so of ecosystem
models, can strongly impact management outcomes. Results from our MSE based on a
complex food-web model closely follow expectations derived from general mathematical
arguments (Rossberg 2013, Chapter 18; Supplementary Material). The mathematical ar-
guments also appear to be robust to many real-world complications not considered in the
MSE, as already demonstrated for conservation constraints. Structural instability issues
persist when transitioning from stock- to fleet-based management (Rossberg 2012a) or
when multiplying yields by market values. Recruitment variability and imperfect control
of applied fishing pressures lead to additional uncertainty, which structural instability
can enhance (SM S8).
The MSE also highlighted options to mitigate these impacts. The most important
may be adoption of state- rather than pressure targets in management plans. Another
mitigation option is conservatism, i.e. regularization of the inverse problems underlying
the computation of multispecies MSY reference points. The mathematical scheme for this
proposed in SM S9 can be extended to more detailed management models if required. To
determine good degrees of conservatism when direct comparison of long-term management
outcomes is not practical, one can compare simulated outcomes using members of a
plausible model ensemble (Ianelli et al. 2015), applying conservative reference points
derived with another model.
The EU’s current approach to implementing its Common Fisheries Policy (CFP, EU
2013), here modelled as Single Species Control, is mathematically similar to aiming at the
Nash Pressure objective using Pressure Target Control without systematic conservatism
(SM S6). Our analysis shows that this type of management plan is particularly vulner-
able to structural instability. Expected yields are therefore comparatively low. These
difficulties are illustrated in simulations by Lynam and Mackinson (2014) predicting that
a transition to the MSY exploitation rates recommended by the International Council for
the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) will lower rather than raise total long-term yields.
4.3 Choice of objective
The MSE showed that the consequences of the two major policy choices we considered,
i.e. of objective and of strategy to achieve it, are qualitatively independent. They are
therefore discussed separately hereafter. In doing so, we shall assume that management
models do take structural instability sufficiently into account such that the “standard
conservatism” case in Tab. 1 is representative.
Among the three objectives analysed, sensitivity to structural instability increases
with increasing expected total yield, i.e. in the expected order Nash State → Nash Pres-
sure → Total Yield objective (theoretical expectations are summarised in SM S10). In
view of the high empirical uncertainty in the strengths of multispecies interactions, the
Nash State objective might therefore be favoured by stakeholders, despite the compara-
tively low yields this implies. When combined with State Target Control, it has the added
advantages of transparency and simplicity; stakeholders can focus on simply reaching
agreement on the targeted ecosystem state. Exploitation rates and corresponding yields
required to achieve this state would play a role in negotiations, but not explicitly become
part of agreements. Our results suggest this approach would yield about 20-30% higher
than Single Species Control.
Despite Nash Pressure and Nash State objective having similar definitions, corre-
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sponding expected long-term yields clearly differ. The higher yields predicted for Nash
Pressure could be reason for stakeholders to favour this objective over Nash State. We
therefore caution that we could not find a reason why Nash Pressure should generally
yield more. Indeed, SM S10 constructs counter-examples. This pattern should therefore
be verified using MSEs that vary our setup.
Independent of the higher expected yields, there are two considerations that favour
Nash Pressure over Nash State objective. Firstly, Nash Pressure could be more acceptable
to stakeholders familiar with Single Species Control because it is conceptually similar.
Secondly, the fictitious game underlying the Nash Pressure objective comes closer to the
situation of real multi-stakeholder fisheries than that underlying Nash State. Agreeing
on this objective or variations of it might therefore be easier.
Improvements in yields when going over from Total Yield to Nash Pressure objective
were surprisingly small, if present at all. Even with State Target Control, they were just
16% (standard conservatism). This might be insufficient reason to adopt the Total Yield
objective, considering that this might lead to difficult negotiations, as explained in the
Introduction. Nevertheless we anticipate that, when either Nash Pressure or Nash State
objective is taken as the starting point for negotiations, they will develop towards the
Total Yield objective by agreements on modifications of targets that give higher overall
yields or incomes.
4.4 Choice of strategy
Considering the choice of strategy, out MSE strongly favours State Target Control over
Pressure Target Control. This result is expected (SM S10), because structural instability
leads to large changes in community structure in response to small changes (or errors) in
applied pressures. It is worth noting that, for the same reasons, community structure is
expected to be highly sensitive to changes in the physical environment. Within limits,
State Target Control counteracts this sensitivity. We warn that MSE that do not use
a structurally unstable operating model, e.g. an operating model with non-interacting
species, will be unable to reproduce these phenomena!
While Pressure Target Control is currently favoured by the EU for most stocks, State
Target Control is either legal or de-facto policy, e.g., in the U.S.A., Canada, and New
Zealand. Even the EU does not appear to be legally bound to Pressure Target Control.
The CFP in its current form requires, according to Article 2, that “management [...]
restores and maintains populations of harvested species above levels which can produce
the maximum sustainable yield.” It does then set deadlines for adjusting exploitation
rates accordingly, but these are not the principal objective. Further, the CFP requires
formulation of multiannual management plans with “objectives that are consistent with
the objectives set out in Article 2 [...]”. The plans shall include “quantifiable targets such
as fishing mortality rates and/or spawning stock biomass”. However, considering the low
expected yields from Pressure Target Control, we suggest that multiannual plans setting
targets for fishing mortality or exploitation rates may not actually be consistent with the
objectives set out in Article 2.
Self-Optimising Control strategies have their own strengths. They are largely insen-
sitive to structural instability, do not require conservatism, and yet achieve long-term
yields nearly as large as those from State Target Control. Further, the corresponding
mHCRs are independent of productivity rates (ri in Eq. (2)), which lets these strategies
automatically adjusts stock sizes to corrected MSY levels if productivities change because
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of short-term or long-term environmental change.
A specific disadvantage of Self-Optimising Control with Total Yield objective, Trans-
posed Interactions Control, is that the prescribed exploitation rate of a stock depends on
the abundances of all stocks on which it has a direct ecological effect: prey, predators, and
competitors. This can increase measurement and planning uncertain. (For State Target
Control such dependencies enter through neutralising exploitation rates, but there only
as corrections to past observations, so uncertainty is lower.) Despite its elegance, Trans-
posed Interactions Control might therefore be preferred only in exceptional cases, e.g.
for data-rich single-stakeholder fisheries that have already approached the Total Yield
objective and require a scheme to effectively adapt to uncertain environmental change.
4.5 Implementation
Most management plans we discussed require for their implementation two models with
different skills (Dickey-Collas et al. 2014). The first is what we called the management
model. It serves to compute parameters of mHCRs consistent with objectives. Emphasis
is on the skill to make long-term MSY projections.
In practice, a second type of model is needed to determine the stock sizes Bi required
to compute exploitation rates Fi from mHCRs and to convert these into catch allowances.
Conventional age or size-structured stock-assessment models can be use for this. They
have the desired skill to accurately determine current states of stocks based on current and
historical data. State Target Control requires in addition that these models can estimate
neutralising exploitation rates. To achieve this, they must be capable of forecasting
states for given exploitation rates a few years into the future. The key skill is therefore
short-term projection.
Strategies to implement these two model types will be different. For long-term projec-
tions, interactions with the ecosystem at large and general principles such as conservation
and dissipation of energy as it flows through food chains will be important. For short-term
projections, optimal use of available data will be key, as with current stock-assessment
models.
5 Conclusions
Because in fact fish stocks do interact, it is not obvious how the frequently invoked MSY
policy objective should be translated to real-world fisheries. Answering questions Q1
raised in Introduction, we listed a range of management objectives that would for an
isolated stock all reduce to classical MSY. Policy needs to clarify which one is meant!
Addressing Q2, we considered a range of harvest control rules and implementation details,
and found that management outcomes depend sensitively on their choice.
Answering Q3, the preceding Discussion highlighted trade-offs among management
options: the plans expected to generate highest yields require large changes in manage-
ment practice, accurate data, and/or good collaboration among stakeholders. The EU’s
current scheme of Single Species Control yields substantially less than most other options
(Table 1), which answers Q4.
While there are tradeoffs among all options considered, we propose as a conceivable
step towards increased effectiveness, sophistication, and predictability of EU fisheries
management a transition to State Target Control with a Nash Pressure objective. In
the present study, we evaluated the scheme F = F0 + (1 − BMSY/B)/T , where F0 is
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the neutralising exploitation rate, B is the current stock size, and T is a relaxation
time parameter, arbitrarily chosen as T =1yr. If the resulting value for F is negative,
it is replaced by zero. When applied to an isolated species, the graph of F vs. B for
the corresponding HCR is similar, e.g., to that of the Fishery Decision-Making Frame-
work used by the Canadian government (http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/fm-gp/peches-
fisheries/fish-ren-peche/sff-cpd/precaution-eng.htm), except that F is allowed
to exceed the predicted value for FMSY. Increases of F beyond FMSY can be necessary be-
cause FMSY is uncertain and an uncontrolled stock size larger than the target value BMSY
could lead, through multispecies interactions, to unintended and uncontrolled effects on
other stocks, a situation that State Target Control aims to avoid.
Variations of this mHCR are conceivable, and many may be similarly effective. For ex-
ample, following discussion within the Working Group on Multispecies Assessment Meth-
ods of ICES (ICES 2014b), we evaluated the modified rule F = F0−|FSSC|(1−B/BMSY),
where FSSC is the target exploitation rate of the Single Species Control scheme. While
with this modified rule target stock size is approached at the potentially slower rate
|FSSC|, the rule has the intriguing property that it would reduce to F = FSSC, i.e. to
conventional Single Species Control, if the single-species Schaefer model was accurate.
Reality is more complicated and the HCR will deviate from Single Species Control, but
these deviations may be small. Applying our MSE to this rule with a Nash Pressure
objective, we obtain on average long-term total yield of 75.4% MSYtheo (standard conser-
vatism), not significantly different from the result using our original State Target Control
rule (p = 0.15, paired t-test). Such results open up the possibility of swiftly transition-
ing from the current scheme to State Target Control, enabling higher future yields and
more predictable ecological outcomes, with minimal changes to currently recommended
exploitation rates.
As discussed above, the formulation of EU’s CFP is open to both Pressure Target
Control and State Target Control. We recommend using of this flexibility to achieve best
possible outcomes for society and the marine environment.
Supplementary material
As Supplementary material, we provide a PDF file with mathematical definitions and
analyses of management objectives and strategies, details of the methods used to imple-
ment these in our MSE, and statistical details of results.
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These supplementary materials mainly provide two kinds of information. (A) Mathe-
matical formulations and analyses of management objectives and strategies and (B) fur-
ther details and formal descriptions of the MSE reported in the paper. Sections S1 to S10
incrementally build upon each other. To follow the arguments it is therefore advised to
read the material sequentially. Section S11 provides additional technical information on
the MSE, and is largely independent of the previous sections.
S1 Management objectives
We provide formal mathematical descriptions of the three major types of objectives con-
sidered in the main text, Nash Pressure, Nash State, and Total Yield. Among the possible
ways to achieve these objectives, only idealised community steady states with fixed stock
biomasses B∗i (i = 1, . . . , SF ) shall here be considered. Even when such states are not
stable for a given and rigidly fixed set of exploitation rates Fi, it will often be possible
to stabilise it by letting exploitation rates vary sightly around their long-term averages
according to appropriate harvest control rules. Thus, oscillatory states, which are eco-
nomically undesirable, can be avoided and need not be considered here.
With the long-term yield per unit time interval from species i given by Yi = B
∗
i Fi
(i = 1, ..., SF ), the corresponding total yield is Y =
∑SF
i Yi. To keep the formalism simple,
we assume that the relationship between combinations of (averaged) exploitation rates
Fi and attainable steady states B
∗
i is one-to-one, so that community steady states and
the corresponding yields can be parameterized in terms of the corresponding exploitation
rates Fi. Coverage of ambiguities in the description of states by corresponding pressures
would inflate the mathematical formalism without adding much understanding of use for
the present work.
Mathematically, the Total Yield objective is attained with a set of exploitation rates
Fi = FMSY,i such that
Y (FMSY,1, ..., FMSY,S) = max
F∈RSF≥0
Y (F1, ..., FS) (Total Yield). (S1)
As conventional, R≥0 denotes the set of all non-negative real numbers and RSF≥0 a set of
SF -component vectors of non-negative real numbers. Specifically, F denotes the vector
of fishing mortalities Fi.
The Nash Pressure objective is attained for a set of fishing mortality rates Fi =
FMSY,i ∈ RSF≥0 such that
Yi(FMSY,1, ..., FMSY,S) = max
Fi∈R≥0
Yi(FMSY,1, ..., Fi, ..., FMSY,S) (Nash Pressure) (S2)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ S. The Nash State objective is best defined using a parameterization in
terms of corresponding states B∗i = BMSY,i ≥ 0: for all 1 ≤ i ≤ S,
Yi(BMSY,1, ..., BMSY,S) = max
B∗i ∈R≥0
Yi(BMSY,1, ..., B
∗
i , ..., BMSY,S) (Nash State). (S3)
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S2 The Operating Model
S2.1 Model structure and parameterization
The Population-Dynamical Matching Model (PDMM) generates large model communi-
ties using an iterative process representing the natural assembly of complex ecological
communities. A full description of the model equations, including all parameters and
variables, is given in Rossberg (2013, Chapter 22). We describe here only the model’s
main features.
A PDMM model community consists of S = SP +SC species of which SP are producers
and SC are consumers. Each species j is characterised by its adult body mass and a
5-component vector of abstract vulnerability traits, and consumers in addition by a 5-
component vector of abstract foraging traits. The trait vectors locate species in trophic
niche space (Nagelkerke and Rossberg 2014; Rossberg et al. 2010). They are thought to
be related in an undescribed way to the phenotype of species. The state of the population
of each species j is characterised by its population biomass Bj alone.
For any conceivable consumer-resource pair, their trophic interaction strength depends
on their body mass ratio and the relative position of their traits in trophic niche space.
Interaction strengths are large if the producer is in the consumer’s preferred size range and
if the vulnerability trait vector of the producer is close to the position of the consumer’s
foraging traits vector. The available trophic niche space is restricted by constraining the
maximum length of vulnerability traits vectors.
Starting from a few producer and consumer species, larger communities are assembled
by alternately adding new species that differ from a resident species by a small change in
adult body mass and traits, and then simulating the population dynamics of the system
to a new equilibrium. The species that go extinct in the extended community are removed
in each iteration.
Community dynamics is formulated through a set of coupled ordinary differential
equations, each representing the dynamics of one species’ population. In the most generic
form, this system of ODEs can be expressed by Eq. (1) of the main text.
In system (1), the linear growth rates gi(B1, . . . , BS) are non-linear functions of their
arguments, including extended type II functional responses, which are nonlinear func-
tions of the biomasses B1, . . . , BS. Details are as in Rossberg (2013, Chapter 22), with
modifications as given at the end of this section. These type II functional responses
complicates the interpretation of model outputs, compared to simpler interaction terms,
but have been shown to lead to dynamically stable food-webs with topologies similar to
those seen in natural terrestrial and aquatic communities, which are otherwise difficult
to build.
As shown by Rossberg (2013), the size of PDMM communities scales approximately
linearly with a parameter X that controls both the probability of direct competition
among producers and the maximum length of vulnerability traits vectors. The outcome
of, say, doubling X is to halve the probability of direct competition among producers and
to double the volume of trophic niche space, which is similar to simply modelling two
communities in parallel and then “rewiring” interactions to go criss-cross between the
two communities. Results reported in Table 1 of the main text correspond to the choice
X = 2, for comparison we also report corresponding results for X = 1.
For X = 2 and with the model definition used by Rossberg (2013) we found that
producers tended to evolve increasingly larger body sizes, which is undesirable for studies
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of open-ocean communities. We avoided this by going back to a model formulation of
Rossberg et al. (2008), where producer population growth rates are given by
gi(B1, . . . , BS) = si
[
exp
(
−
∑
producers j
dijBj
)
− l
]
1− l − predation, (S4)
with l = 0.5, rather than using the Lotka-Volterra-type model
gi(B1, . . . , BS) = si
[
1−
∑
producers j
dijBj
]
− predation (S5)
of Rossberg (2013). To compensate for the resulting slightly lower primary production,
we further had to scale up all consumer attack rates by a factor 5/4—see Rossberg (2012,
2013) for the rationale underlying such fine-tuning of attack rates.
S2.2 The evolutionary search algorithm used to maximise
total yield
Next we describe the method used to find the theoretically maximal total yield MSYtheo
for each model community. For the two types of Nash objectives, no attempts were made
to find the corresponding solutions in the operating model. Numerical methods to find
Nash equilibria seem to be much less developed than algorithms to maximise a single
goal function, such as total equilibrium yield Y . Even the latter problem is formidable in
our case. From experience testing different approaches, it appears that the search space
might best be visualised to have the structure of a mountain landscape such as the Alps.
The main maximum is surrounded by several side maxima of similar magnitude, and
such local maxima may not be connected to each other by steep ridges. Further off, lower
side-maxima can be found. Such goal functions make numerical optimisation difficult.
Standard hill-climbing algorithms, for example, almost inevitably get caught in low local
maxima corresponding to the Prealps.
To find the fishing mortalities achieving the Total Yield objective, Eq. (S1), we there-
fore used the Improved Stochastic Ranking Evolution Strategy (ISRES) of Runarsson and
Yao (2005), as implemented in nlopt v2.3 (http://ab-initio.mit.edu/wiki/index.
php/NLopt). The optimisation library nlopt provides implementations of several optimi-
sation algorithms, easily accessible through various programming languages. We describe
ISRES here in some detail, because, at one crucial point, we had to modify it.
ISRES is an evolutionary search algorithm that iteratively computes the goal function
for a population of parameters combinations xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n, here xi = lnFi and n =
SF ), chooses a sub-set of “surviving” good combinations, and then obtains the next
generation of the population by randomly mutating the parameters of survivors (there
is no recombination step). Together with the parameters xi themselves, the mutation
step sizes are inherited and mutated along lineages. Specifically, parameter x′i and its
mutation step sizes σ′i in the next generation are computed from the values xi and σi of
a survivor of the current generation according to the rule
σˆi = σi exp (τ
′ξ + τξi) , (S6a)
x′i = xi + σˆiξ
′
i, (S6b)
σ′i = σi + α · (σˆi − σi), (S6c)
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where ξ, ξi, and ξ
′
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are independent random numbers with standard-normal
distributions, and the parameters τ and τ ′ are chosen following Schwefel (1993). The last
step, Eq. (S6c), with α = 0.2, follows a proposal by Runarsson (2002). It controls the
degree of heritability of the “phenotype” σˆi of mutation step size along lineages, and so
provides for some memory and accumulation of experience with different mutation step
sizes as lineages evolve.
The problem we encountered with this scheme is that Eq. (S6c) biases mutations of
lnσi towards larger values in the absence of selection pressures. It so undermines the
intention of Eq. (S6a) to find the appropriate order of magnitude of σi by conducting a
free search on the lnσi axis until selection sets in because a good value of σi is found.
Starting with large values of σi, the rugged goal function of our problem does not provide
sufficient cues for good mutation step sizes to counteract this bias, so that step sizes
remain large and the algorithm never converges.
We overcame this problem by replacing Eq. (S6c) with a corresponding exponentially
declining memory on the log σi-scale. Specifically, we set
σ′i =
√
σˆiσi. (S6c’)
For each iteration of the search algorithm, total yield Y was computed from the
steady state reached after starting simulations from the virgin community and fishing
it at constant exploitation rates Fi. To simplify calculations, no attempt was made to
stabilise dynamics when oscillatory attractors were reached. Rather, we averaged yield
Y in this case over a sufficiently long time interval to obtain the mean long-term yield.
S3 Calibrating the management model
The idea behind our calibration of the management model, i.e., of the multispecies Schae-
fer model in Eq. (2) of the main text, is to perform first an adiabatic elimination of all
non-fish species from the PDMM, and then to choose parameters of the Schaefer model
such that it reproduces the dynamics of the PDMM to linear order in the distance from
the PDMM’s current state.
Technically, this is achieved to a good approximation by first numerically computing
the interaction matrix G′ (Berlow et al. 2004) of the PDMM model community, given by
its entries
G′ij = −
∂gi(B1, . . . , BS)
∂Bj
, (S7)
and then dividing it into blocks
G′ =
(
GFF GFN
GNF GNN
)
(S8)
pertaining to direct interactions within and between the communities of fish (F) and
non-fish (N) species. Elimination of the non-fish species is achieved by computing the
effective SF × SF interaction matrix for fish
G = GFF −GFNG−1NNGNF. (S9)
The linear growth rates ri entering the Schaefer model are then obtained as
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ri = gi(B1, . . . , BS) +
SF∑
j
GijBj + Fi. (S10)
The resulting Schaefer model can be written in matrix notation as
dB
dt
= [r−GB− F] ◦B (S11)
where ◦ denotes the Hadamard or the entrywise product.
S4 Effects of structural instability of the operating
model on the management model
We now sketch some considerations relating structural instability of the operating model
to properties of the management model. Mathematically versed readers will note that
we gloss over several technical intricacies which could presumably be ironed out through
more elaborate technical arguments.
For structurally unstable ecological models, the ecological interaction matrix tends
to have several eigenvalues λ near zero (Rossberg 2013). Hence, there are S-component
vectors e of lengths |e| = 1 such that
G′e = λe ≈ 0 (S12)
because λ ≈ 0. This phenomenon persists even after scaling out differences in the charac-
teristic populations sizes and rates of change for different ecological groups, as achieved
by going over to a representation in terms of the competitive overlap matrix (Rossberg
2013), which is why we shall disregard such differences for the present considerations.
Dividing G′ into blocks as in Eq. (S8) and correspondingly writing
e =
(
eF
eN
)
, (S13)
Eq. (S12) becomes
GFFeF + GFNeN ≈ 0, (S14a)
GNFeF + GNNeN ≈ 0. (S14b)
Now one needs to distinguish two cases. The first is given by |eF|2  1 and |eN|2 ≈ 1,
in the second |eF|2 is of the order of magnitude of one. In the first case, Eq. (S14b)
reduces to GNNeN ≈ 0, implying that GNN has eigenvalues near zero. Matrices that have
eigenvalues near zero and others further away are said to be ill-conditioned. The inverse
of such a matrix, e.g. G−1NN, depends sensitively on the values of matrix entries. Since
G−1NN enters the effective interaction matrix for fish through Eq. (S9), this can degrade
the accuracy of G in describing interactions among fish.
In the second case, elimination of eN from Eq. (S14a) using Eq. (S14b) leads to
0 ≈ GFFeF −GFNG−1NNGNFeF = GeF, (S15)
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implying that the effective interaction matrix G itself has eigenvalues near zero. As a
result, the Schaefer model Eq. (S11) is then structurally unstable.
Thus, structural instability of the operating model can make the management model
(S11) an inaccurate description of the interactions among fish or translate into structural
instability of the management model itself. For large, complex operating models, as in our
case, one can expect both cases to play out to varying degrees. With the more elaborate
management models used in practice, this inheritance of structural instability is likely to
prevail in similar, albeit less transparent, form.
S5 Solving the management model for MSY
objectives and mHCR parameters
S5.1 Standard case
We now derive the parameters entering the mHCR in Section 2.3 of the main text for
the objectives that we consider. Setting aside the possibility of extirpations (B∗i = 0),
equilibrium solutions of Eq. (S11) satisfy
F = r−GB∗ (S16)
We assume that G is non-singular, even though it might be ill-conditioned. Equa-
tion (S16) then implies immediately the relations
∂Fi
∂B∗j
= −Gij and ∂B
∗
i
∂Fj
= −G−1ij , (S17)
which we shall use in the following.
Making use of the continuity of the derivatives in Eq. (S17), one obtains, using stan-
dard arguments, necessary conditions for satisfaction of the objectives described in Sec-
tion S1. For the Total Yield objective these are, with 1 ≤ i ≤ SF ,
0 =
∂Y
∂Fi
=
∂
∑
j FjB
∗
j
∂Fi
= B∗i +
∑
j
Fj
∂B∗j
∂Fi
, i.e. 0 = B∗T − FTG−1, (S18)
(with T denoting matrix transposition); for the Nash Pressure objective
0 =
∂Yi
∂Fi
=
∂FiB
∗
i
∂Fi
= B∗i + Fi
∂B∗i
∂Fi
, i.e. 0 = B∗T − FTdiag(G−1), (S19)
with diag(M) denoting the diagonal matrix with diagonal entries given by those of M;
and for the Nash State objective
0 =
∂Yi
∂Bi
=
∂FiB
∗
i
∂B∗i
=
∂Fi
∂B∗i
B∗i + Fi, i.e. 0 = −diag(G)B∗ + F. (S20)
All three conditions can be re-written as
F = GˆTB∗, (S21)
where for the Total Yield objective Gˆ = G, for Nash Pressure Gˆ = diag(G−1)−1, and for
Nash State Gˆ = diag(G).
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The Self-Optimising Control rules are obtained as
F = GˆTB, (S22)
by simply replacing the equilibrium values B∗ with the current values B of stock sizes in
Eq. (S21). State targets B∗ = BMSY are obtained by putting Eq. (S21) into Eq. (S16)
and solving for B∗:
BMSY =
(
G + GˆT
)−1
r. (S23)
Pressure targets F = FMSY are obtained by combining Eqs. (S21) and (S23):
FMSY = Gˆ
TBMSY = Gˆ
T
(
G + GˆT
)−1
r. (S24)
S5.2 Modifications to incorporate conservation constraints
Results in Table 2 of the main text were computed using variants of Eq. (S23) and
Eq. (S24) that take conservation constraints into account. These are given by the follow-
ing algorithm.
For each species i, a conservation threshold biomasses Bcons,i is first defined as 10%
of the species’ biomass in the unexploited community (Matsuda and Abrams 2006). If
BMSY,i, as computed using Eq. (S23), falls below this threshold for one or more species,
the species i with the lowest ratio BMSY,i/Bcons,i is identified and its target abundance
set to Bcons,i. Fixing Bi = Bcons,i in Eq. (S11) and eliminating species i from the system
leads to a new Schaefer (or Lotka-Volterra) model of the same form as Eq. (S11) with
one fewer species. For this model Eq. (S23) is re-evaluated. This procedure is repeated
until BMSY,i > Bcons,i for all remaining species. Equation (S24) is then evaluated with
BMSY,i replaced by Bcons,i where applicable.
S6 Target fishing mortalities for Single Species
Control
To derive a HCR for Single Species Control of the ith fish species, we proceeded essentially
along the same route as that leading to Eq. (S24), but now adiabatically eliminating all
species but species i to obtain the single-species case of the Schaefer model Eq. (S11).
To obtain the non-linear coefficient g˜i corresponding to the interaction matrix G in the
single-species model
dBi
dt
= [r˜i − g˜iBi − Fi]Bi, (S25)
observe that G−1, as defined through Eq. (S9), is the upper left SF × SF block of the
inverse of G′ (Bernstein 2005). Correspondingly, g˜−1i is the 1 × 1 block on the diagonal
of G′−1 corresponding to species i, which this is also the ith diagonal element of G−1.
The coefficient r˜i for the linear growth rate in Eq. (S25) is obtained following the idea
of Eq. (S10), for simplicity assuming equilibrium (gi(...) = 0), as r˜i = g˜iBi + Fi. The
combined Schaefer models so obtained for the SF fish species can be summarised in matrix
notation as
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dB
dt
=
[
r˜− G˜B− F
]
◦B (S26)
with G˜ = diag(G−1)−1, which is identical to Gˆ for the Nash Pressure objective.
Managers assuming validity of these SF single-species models will compute MSY tar-
get exploitation rates as
FSSC =
r˜
2
. (S27)
Even though Eq. (S26) disregards multispecies interactions, adaptive management in
which the parameters of Eq. (S26) are iteratively adjusted might eventually converge
to a community state B∗ where indeed, with F = FSSC, the equilibrium condition of
Eq. (S26),
G˜B∗ = r˜− F = F, (S28)
is met. The community then satisfies the Nash Pressure objective, as can be verified by
noting that Eq. (S28) is logically equivalent to Eq. (S21) with Gˆ = G˜ = G˜T. Single
Species Control for MSY can therefore be understood as a technically simple route to
attaining the Nash Pressure objective.
S7 Effects of structural instability of the
management model on mHCR parameters
How do structural instability of the management model and parameter uncertainty in G
(derived in Sec. S4), affect the accuracy at which the parameters of the mHCR, as derived
in Sec. S5, can be computed? To answer this question, we first have to develop further
intuition about the structure of the set of the SF eigenvalues of G. Because G is not
generally symmetric, its eigenvalues are not generally real numbers—they are complex
numbers, represented by points in the complex plane, given by two coordinates: their real
and their imaginary parts. Because the entries of G are real numbers, the distribution
of its eigenvalues over the complex plane is symmetric with respect to reflection on the
real axis.
The eigenvalues of asymmetric random matrices tend to be distributed more or less
evenly over limited areas of the complex plane, and one can expect this to be similarly
the case for G. For ecological model communities built through an assembly process, one
finds that this area is convex and comes close to or touches the origin of the complex plane
(which corresponds to the eigenvalue zero), but does not fully cover it, thus marking the
onset of structural instability (Rossberg 2013). By the sign convention for G used here,
this area is located in the right complex half-plane, where the real parts of eigenvalues
are positive.
The formula for BMSY, Eq. (S23), can be rewritten as BMSY = H
−1r/2 with
H =
G + GˆT
2
. (S29)
The condition of H, and so the impact of inaccuracies in its entries on the accuracy of the
reference points BMSY and FMSY (via Eq. (S24)), depends on G and on the definition of
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Gˆ in terms of G pertinent to the particular objective. The decisive question is how the
operation on G defined by Eq. (S29) transforms the area covered by its eigenvalues in the
complex plane. This depends on the particular management objective chosen. One can
expect that the condition of H becomes poor if the transformed area covers the origin,
i.e. if H has eigenvalues with both negative and positive real parts, and that its condition
becomes good if the transformed area gets detached from the origin.
A first point to note is that, because the sum of all eigenvalues of a matrix equals
the sum of its diagonal elements, the respective arithmetic means are equal as well. The
“centre of gravity” of the eigenvalues of H in the complex plane is therefore identical to
that of G when the diagonal entries of the two matrices are identical, as is the case for
Total Yield and Nash State objective (where Gˆ = G and Gˆ = diag(G), respectively).
In case of the Total Yield objective (Gˆ = G), H is simply the symmetric part of
G. The eigenvalues of the symmetric part of a matrix are always spread out at least as
widely along the real axis as those of the matrix itself (see, e.g., Bhatia 1997, pp. 73-74,
presented more accessibly by Raghavan and Barmish 2006), and generally wider. Because
typically the set of eigenvalues of G comes close to the origin, one can so expect that the
eigenvalues of H cover the origin, implying that H is ill-conditioned.
For the Nash State objective (Gˆ = diag(G)), Eq. (S29) amounts to reducing all off-
diagonal elements of G to half of their values. The effect of this is best understood by first
considering the impact on eigenvalues of the opposite transformation: gradually adding
off-diagonal elements to a diagonal matrix. A simple perturbation analysis (e.g., Bloch
et al. 2012), strictly valid only when the off-diagonal entries of G are small compared to
the diagonal entries, already gives the general trends, which can be confirmed numerically
for larger off-diagonal entries: When exploitative interaction, where Gij and Gji (i 6= j)
have opposite signs, dominate (as for direct predator-prey interactions), the off-diagonal
entries lead to a narrowing of the eigenvalue distribution along the real axis. The general
expectation, e.g., with statistically unrelated or positively correlated Gij and Gji, how-
ever, is that the distribution will be broadened, see, e.g. Proposition 1 of Raghavan and
Barmish (2006), where a situation similar to the uncorrelated case is described. Corre-
spondingly, one can expect that the real parts of the eigenvalues of H are distributed
more narrowly than those of G and so the condition of H is improved, except when
exploitative interactions dominate.
The case of the Nash Pressure objective (Gˆ = diag(G−1)−1) is similar to that for
Nash State, just that now, in addition, the diagonal elements are modified. Applying the
blockwise matrix inversion formula (Bernstein 2005) to compute the first diagonal element
of G−1 as a 1 × 1 block, one obtains the first diagonal element of H for Nash Pressure
from that for Nash State by adding to it −G1,2...SF (G2...SF ,2...SF )−1G2...SF ,1/2, where we
specified matrix blocks by corresponding index ranges. Corresponding formulae apply
for the other diagonal elements of H. Sign and magnitude of these additions depends on
the strength and nature of interactions between species, and also on the condition of the
(SF − 1)× (SF − 1) block inversions. This operation tends to broaden the distribution of
eigenvalues of H along the real axis, so generally worsening the condition of H for Nash
Pressure compared to that for Nash State.
Concluding, these considerations suggest that, for the computation of BMSY and FMSY
reference points, structural instability always has a strong impact under the Total Yield
objective, generally a small impact under the Nash State objective, and for Nash Pressure
an impact that is typically larger than for Nash State but smaller than for Total Yield.
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S8 How yields are affected by inaccuracies in
mHCR reference points
Above, we discussed in several steps how structural instability of ecosystems (or operating
models simulating these) can lead to inaccurate values for the reference points BMSY and
FMSY entering mHCR. To build intuition as to what the implications of these inaccuracies
are for the resulting long-term yields, we consider here briefly the hypothetical situation
where the actual ecosystem was describable by a Schaefer model of the same structure
as Eq. (2) of the main text, with but with true parameters r and G that generally differ
from the “empirical” parameters r and G. If the mHCR are successfully implemented
and so the respective targets attained, the resulting total yield from State Target Control
will be
Y = BTMSY (r−GBMSY) (S30)
and from Pressure Target Control
Y = FTMSYG
−1 (r− FMSY) . (S31)
Similar formulae apply for the individual yield from each stock.
Because in Eq. (S30) G enters directly, small errors in BMSY will only have small
effect on yields. In Eq. (S31), small errors in FMSY can have large impacts on yields if
G is ill-conditioned and so the system structurally unstable (which we expect). Hence
Pressure Target Control is expected to result in larger deviations from the expected
yield than State Target Control. From other sources of uncertainty in pressures, such as
recruitment variability or insufficient control by managers of fishing mortalities, similar
adverse effects of structural instability can be expected.
A more detailed analysis would take account of the error structure in reference points
resulting from the proposed calculation methods. This analysis is not performed here,
because our numerical MSE provides similar information.
S9 Conservatism through matrix regularisation
The manifestation of structural instability discussed in Section S7 implies that the math-
ematical problem underlying the computation of multispecies MSY reference points falls
into the category of ill-posed problems (Hadamard 1923). In practice, such problems are
solved using so-called regularisation methods (Engl et al. 2000). In our case we propose
to compute mHCR parameters from the parameters r and G of the management model
not using Eq. (S23) directly, but instead as
BMSY =
(
G + GˆT + κI
)−1
(r + κB)
= (2H + κI)−1 (r + κB)
(S32)
and FMSY = Gˆ
TBMSY, where κ ≥ 0 is a parameter of dimensions Time−1Biomass−1 or
Time−1 (Biomass/Area)−1, depending on how biomass is quantified.
With κ = 0, Eq. (S32) reduces to the simpler Eq. (S23) without conservatism, de-
rived above. The term κI in Eq. (S32) shifts the eigenvalues of H away from zero, so
improving the condition of the matrix inversion. This method is known as Lavrentiev
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regularisation (Engl et al. 2000). With this modification, Eq. (S32) implements a form
of conservatism: if κ is very large, Eq. (S32) reduces to BMSY = B, i.e. a recommen-
dation to keep stock sizes at their current levels. Equation (S32) applies conservatism
only to those components of B that are aligned with eigenvectors of H corresponding
to eigenvalues near zero, i.e. where conservatism is most useful because numerical un-
certainty is large. This distinguishes Eq. (S32) from alternative conceivable formulae,
e.g. BMSY = (1 + κ)
−1[H−1r/2 + κB], which is also “conservative” for large κ. Conser-
vatism is expected to be beneficial if H is ill-conditioned, and otherwise to be neutral or
detrimental in its effect on the ability of managers to meet objectives.
One might expect that the matrix inversion involved in computing Gˆ = diag(G−1)−1,
required for management towards Nash Pressure objectives, could also be made more
robust using regularisation methods, but we did not find a regularisation schemes that
would improve outcomes among the schemes we experimented with. Except for this, Self-
Optimising Control does not require any matrix inversion, so the above considerations
play no role if Self-Optimising Control is employed.
S10 Summary of theoretical expectations
Based on the preceding discussions, one can expect that, among the objectives we consid-
ered, conservatism will be most important for achieving Total Yield and least important
for Nash State, while for achievement of the Nash Pressure objective conservatism has an
intermediate role to play (Section S7). On the other hand, it is clear that too strong con-
servatism will unnecessarily increase the number of adaptive management cycles required
to approach management goals. Among the target-oriented management strategies, State
Target Control is expected to be more robust than Pressure Target Control (Section S8).
For Self-Optimising Control strategies, conservatism is unnecessary (Section S9).
We note that, based on theoretical considerations alone, it is difficult to formulate
general expectations of whether total yields will be higher under the Nash Pressure or
the Nash State objective. Consider, for example, the case SF = 2, where, based on above
calculations and disregarding model uncertainty, the difference between yields under the
two objectives is
YNS − YNP = G12G21(G12 +G21)(2G11G22r1r2 −G21G22r
2
1 −G11G12r22)
(G11G22 −G12G21)(4G11G22 −G12G21)2 . (S33)
While for perfectly symmetric competition (G11 = G22, G12 = G21, r1 = r2) this difference
evaluates to 4G11G
2
12r
2
1(4G
2
11−G212)−2(G11 +G12)−1, which is typically positive, it is clear
that the sign of Eq. (S33) will flip, e.g., whenever either that of G12 or G21 flips. In
general, pursuit of either Nash Pressure or Nash State objective could therefore result in
higher total yields.
S11 Detailed quantitative outcomes of the MSE
We now present details of the numerical MSEs we conducted based on two sets of com-
munities, generated by using the PDMM with the scaling parameter set to X = 1 and
X = 2, respectively (Section S2.1).
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Figure S2: Yield time series when applying Pressure Target Control (red), State Target
Control (green) and Self-Optimising Control (blue) strategies for the Total Yield objective
on the X = 2 sample communities saved after (a) 6 · 104, (b) 105, (c) 1.5 · 105 and (d)
2 · 105 species added.
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S11.1 Variability among MSE runs
Figure S2 shows typical time series of simulated yields. They correspond to applying the
Pressure Target Control, State Target Control, and Self-Optimising Control management
strategies for the Total Yield objective over a period of 32 management cycles to four
of the sample communities (X = 2) that we studied. It is apparent that yields can
vary substantially between management strategies and between sample communities, and
that even the ranking of yields achieved using the three strategies can vary. In order to
establish the relative performance of different management plans we therefore tested them
on a larger number of sample communities.
S11.2 Standard regularisation and optimal regularisation
The numerical results for plans involving a “standard” degree of conservatism were ob-
tained using a fixed regularisation parameter κ = 5 g−1m2yr−1 in all cases considered
and for all sample communities. To put this value into context, we computed the ratios
FMSY/BMSY for Single Species Control for all fish species from all virgin model commu-
nities, and found that our choice for κ corresponds approximately to the 2/3 quantile of
their distribution. This comparison should be useful for choosing a corresponding reg-
ularisation parameter in practical applications. In particular, it is noteworthy that κ is
not such a “small” parameter here as the theory of matrix regularisation might suggest.
To compare this choice of κ with outcomes for other choices, we conducted, for each
plan and each sample community, a series of 9 MSE, using a set of 9 log-equidistant values
of the regularisation parameter ranging from κ = 0.5 g−1m2yr−1 to κ = 50 g−1m2yr−1.
To facilitate the comparison, we normalised for each sample community and each plan
the average yields to the maximum value across the 9 runs, and from this computed
mean and standard deviations across all sample communities. Thus, the value 1 for the
mean (and standard deviation 0) associated with a certain regularisation parameter value
would indicate that the use of that value produces always (i.e for all sample communities)
the highest yield for the plan under consideration. The calculated means and standard
deviations for both X = 1 and X = 2 communities are shown in Figure S3 (a) and (b),
respectively.
The results of Figure S3 show that our choice of the standard value κ = 5 g−1m2yr−1
generally performs close to the “best” value (i.e. the value corresponding to the largest
means shown in Figure S3). While some modest yield improvements can be achieved in
some cases by adjusting κ, it should be observed that the standard deviations shown in
Figure S3 remain large even for the points with the highest mean (i.e. the “best” κ),
indicating high variability among sample communities in terms of the best-performing κ.
This idiosyncratic behaviour appears to be most pronounced for Pressure Target Control
and for Nash-type objectives.
S11.3 Detailed quantitative results
In Figures S4 and S5 we display a detailed quantitative comparison of the outcomes of
the MSEs. A key to the codes we used for different plans is given in Table S3. Figure S4
displays graphically and numerically mean and standard deviation of the proportion
of theoretical MSY attained, as well as the standard error of the mean. In order to
account for a weak correlation between results from subsequently sampled communities,
the standard errors of the mean in Figure S4 were computed based on the “effective”
35
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 1.1
 0.5  1  2  5  10  20  50
Regularisation parameter κ (g-1m2yr-1)
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 1.1
 0.5  1  2  5  10  20  50
Regularisation parameter κ (g-1m2yr-1)
(a)(i) (b)(i)
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 1.1
 0.5  1  2  5  10  20  50
Regularisation parameter κ (g-1m2yr-1)
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 1.1
 0.5  1  2  5  10  20  50
Regularisation parameter κ (g-1m2yr-1)
(a)(ii) (b)(ii)
Figure S3: Dependence on the regularisation parameter κ of the mean (lines and markers)
and standard deviation (bars) of the normalised yield calculated across all (a) X = 1 and
(b) X = 2 sample communities, when managing towards (i) Total Yield and (ii) Nash
Pressure objectives. The results for Pressure Target Control are shown with red lines and
triangle markers, those for State Target Control with green lines and square markers.
Table S3: Key to nomenclature used in Figures S4 and S5
optimal conservatism
Nash Pressure
Nash State
Total Yield
Pressure Target Control
State Target Control
Self-Optimising Control
o c
Np
Ns
-
PTC
STC
SOC
SSC: Single Species Control MSYt: theoretical MSY
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X = 1 X = 2
Figure S4: The means (bars), standard deviations and the standard errors of the mean (er-
ror bars) for total yields (in proportion to theoretical maximum MSYt), calculated across
the all X = 1 (left) X = 2 (right) model communities, when applying Self-Optimising
Control (blue), Pressure Target Control (red) and State Target Control (green) strategies,
compared with results for Single Species Control (grey).
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Comparison of yields
CFP 1.00 0.00 0.69 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
NpSOC 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.67 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.52 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NpPTC 0.69 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
cNpPTC 0.14 0.00 0.03 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00
ocNpPTC 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.51 0.90 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.94 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NpSTC 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.51 1.00 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.39 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
cNpSTC 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.24 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ocNpSTC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.00
NsSOC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
NsPTC 0.17 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
cNsPTC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ocNsPTC 0.04 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NsSTC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
cNsSTC 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
ocNsSTC 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.94 0.39 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SOC 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.11 0.42 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.45 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
PTC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
cPTC 0.25 0.00 0.14 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00
ocPTC 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.56 0.89 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.92 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
STC 0.17 0.00 0.14 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.81 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
cSTC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
ocSTC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
MSYt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
NsSTC cNsSTC ocNsSTC SOC PTC cPTC ocPTC STC cSTC ocSTC MSYtNsSOC NsPTC cNsPTC ocNsPTCCFP NpSOC NpPTC cNpPTC ocNpPTCNpSTC cNpSTC ocNpSTC
Comparison of survival rates
CFP 1.00 0.00 0.98 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.90 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NpSOC 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.48 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NpPTC 0.98 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.89 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
cNpPTC 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.93 0.55 0.00
ocNpPTC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.83 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.80 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
NpSTC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.37 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.60 0.73 0.00
cNpSTC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ocNpSTC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.02 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.23 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NsSOC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NsPTC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.07 0.69 0.07 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.47 0.86 0.00
cNsPTC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.06 0.37 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.58 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.52 0.00
ocNsPTC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.02 0.98 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00
NsSTC 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
cNsSTC 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ocNsSTC 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.61 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SOC 0.25 0.00 0.28 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.23 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
PTC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00
cPTC 0.90 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ocPTC 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.66 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.00 0.49 0.14 0.00
STC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
cSTC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.00
ocSTC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.03 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.52 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.07 1.00 0.00
MSYt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
NsSTC cNsSTC ocNsSTC SOC PTC cPTC ocPTC STC cSTC ocSTC MSYtCFP NpSOC NpPTC cNpPTC ocNpPTC NpSTC cNpSTC ocNpSTC NsSOC NsPTC cNsPTC ocNsPTC
Comparison of mean log sizes
CFP 1.00 0.06 0.55 0.20 0.02 0.85 0.20 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.45 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.37 0.95 0.00
NpSOC 0.06 1.00 0.01 0.36 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.30 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.07 0.59 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.76 0.48 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00
NpPTC 0.55 0.01 1.00 0.08 0.00 0.44 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.84 0.02 0.03 0.34 0.13 0.50 0.00
cNpPTC 0.20 0.36 0.08 1.00 0.08 0.17 0.87 0.83 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.20 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.70 0.88 0.01 0.47 0.12 0.00
ocNpPTC 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.08 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.41 0.06 0.19 0.41 0.21 0.22 0.00 0.01 0.21 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
NpSTC 0.85 0.00 0.44 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.34 0.16 0.09 0.01 0.29 0.79 0.00
cNpSTC 0.20 0.07 0.07 0.87 0.00 0.06 1.00 0.39 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.58 0.69 0.00 0.42 0.05 0.00
ocNpSTC 0.12 0.30 0.04 0.83 0.01 0.02 0.39 1.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.86 0.96 0.00 0.26 0.03 0.00
NsSOC 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.69 0.34 0.89 0.03 0.40 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NsPTC 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.41 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.69 1.00 0.14 0.36 0.23 0.90 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
cNsPTC 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.34 0.14 1.00 0.30 0.04 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ocNsPTC 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.89 0.36 0.30 1.00 0.13 0.68 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
NsSTC 0.05 0.59 0.02 0.20 0.41 0.01 0.07 0.32 0.03 0.23 0.04 0.13 1.00 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.54 0.30 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00
cNsSTC 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.90 0.25 0.68 0.06 1.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ocNsSTC 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.95 0.25 0.67 0.05 0.83 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SOC 0.21 0.00 0.52 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.72 0.01 0.00 0.41 0.01 0.02 0.00
PTC 0.45 0.02 0.84 0.10 0.01 0.34 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.72 1.00 0.06 0.04 0.54 0.14 0.37 0.00
cPTC 0.08 0.76 0.02 0.70 0.21 0.16 0.58 0.86 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.54 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.06 1.00 0.79 0.01 0.18 0.06 0.00
ocPTC 0.15 0.48 0.03 0.88 0.07 0.09 0.69 0.96 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.30 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.79 1.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00
STC 0.15 0.00 0.34 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.54 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
cSTC 0.37 0.08 0.13 0.47 0.01 0.29 0.42 0.26 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.18 0.21 0.01 1.00 0.08 0.00
ocSTC 0.95 0.00 0.50 0.12 0.00 0.79 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.37 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.08 1.00 0.00
MSYt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
CFP NpSOC NpPTC cNpPTC ocNpPTC NpSTC cNpSTC ocNpSTC NsSOC NsPTC cNsPTC ocNsPTC NsSTC cNsSTC ocNsSTC SOC PTC cPTC ocPTC STC cSTC ocSTC MSYt
Figure S5: The p-values from two-sided paired t-tests comparing normalised yields (top),
survival rates (centre) and mean log sizes (bottom) for each pairing of 23 plans over the
37 sample communities for X = 2, corresponding to Figure S4 (right). Values larger than
0.05 and 0.1 are highlighted in yellow and red, respectively.
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number of degrees of freedom following Pyper and Peterman (1998), rather than the
actual sample size (total number of sample communities).
Because all plans were evaluated based on the same set of sample communities, so
that MSE were not statistically independent, we used two-sided paired t-tests to assess
the statistical significance of differences between outcomes of different plans. Outcomes
of the t-tests for X = 2 for each pair of plans are shown in Figure S5. For the smaller
(X = 1) communities, this comparison had slightly lower statistical power, but otherwise
produced very similar results.
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